2 4.1 Linear Prices versus Vertical Restraints

2.1 4.1.1 Basic Framework

  • A single supplier, called the monopolist or the manufacturer, produces an intermediate good at a constant unit cost \(c\).
  • He is the only producer of this good.
  • He sells it to a single downstream firm, called the retailer.
  • The retailer resells the product.
  • \(p_{w}\) denotes the wholesale price and \(p\) the consumer price.
  • \(q\) denotes the quantity bought by the retailer; it also denotes the final consumption if the retailer does not throw away any of the intermediate good.
  • The consumers’ demand function is denoted \(q = D(p)\).

2.1.1 Common Forms of Contracting

  • A linear price is a contract specifying only a payment, \(T(q) = p_{w}q\) from the retailer to the manufacturer.
  • A franchise fee, \(A\), gives rise to the simplest example of a nonlinear price. The retailer then pays \(T(q) = A + p_{w}q\)
  • Resale-price maintenance (RPM) is a provision in the contract dectating the choice of the final price, \(p\), to the retailer. Variants of this restraint are a price ceiling (\(p \leq \overline{p}\)) and a price floor (\(p \geq \underline{p}\)).
  • Quantity fixing specifies the amount, \(q\) to be bought by the retailer. Variants of this restraint are quantity forcing (\(q \geq \underline{q}\)) and quantity rationing (\(q \leq \overline{q}\))

2.2 4.1.2 Intrabrand Competition

  • Introduce the possibility of competition among several retailers on the same market.
  • New type of restraint: exclusive territories

2.3 4.1.3 Several Inputs

  • Now assume that the downstream unit uses several inputs to produce the final good.
  • The downstream unit can be a producer, or can be a retailer who sells complementary products to the customer.
  • A new restraint: tie in, in which one of the input suppliers forces the downstream unit to purchase the other inputs from him.
  • The manufacturer can also impose a payment, called a royalty, proportional to the number of units sold downstream.

2.4 4.1.4 Interbrand Competition

  • The retailer may sell goods that are close substitutes for the good supplied by the manufacturer.
  • The manufacturer may then impose exclusive dealing on the retailer, which prevents him form selling goods that compete directly with the manufacturer’s product.